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Pain is a complex and multidimensional perception, embodied in our daily experiences
through interoceptive appraisal processes. The article reviews the recent literature
about interoception along with predictive coding theories and tries to explain a missing
link between the sense of the physiological condition of the entire body and the
perception of pain in chronic conditions, which are characterized by interoceptive deficits.
Understanding chronic pain from an interoceptive point of view allows us to better
comprehend the multidimensional nature of this specific organic information, integrating
the input of several sources from Gifford’s Mature Organism Model to Melzack’s
neuromatrix. The article proposes the concept of residual interoceptive images (ghosts),
to explain the diffuse multilevel nature of chronic pain perceptions. Lastly, we introduce
a treatment concept, forged upon the possibility to modify the interoceptive chronic
representation of pain through external input in a process that we call interoceptive
modeling, with the ultimate goal of reducing pain in chronic subjects.
Keywords: chronic pain, interoception, interoceptive modeling, free energy, predictive coding
BACKGROUND
Human beings are embodied organisms, our bodies provide the substrate for a broad range of
experiences that deeply intertwine emotions, feelings, physical and psychological conditions. For
this very reason, the body constitutes a core element in human mental representations as well.
Albeit its role in human cognition has always represented a challenge, in the past years the study of
the inner representation of the body has become hectic thanks to the compelling work of Craig on
the lamina I spinothalamocortical system that redefined the concept of interoception as the sense
of the physiological condition of the entire organism (Craig, 2003).
Craig’s work provided neuroanatomical evidence of a metacognitive matrix in the right anterior
insula cortex (AIC) that integrates input from all the tissues through specific afferent primary
fibers (Aδ and C), creating the perception of the “material self ” that sustains subjective feelings
and self-awareness (Craig, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2009). These inputs are collected from a wide range
of physiological systems; afferent lines are activated in a graded manner by all sort of autonomic
functions from temperature, to pain, from immune, hormonal, and cardiovascular activity, to
touch, hunger and thirst, effectively creating a complex metacognitive map of all the active
processes in the organism. AIC displays connections to the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) that
co-activates in several imaging studies (Reiman, 1997; Bartels and Zeki, 2000; Damasio et al.,
2000; Blood and Zatorre, 2001) providing evidence that ACC incorporates the behavioral and
motivational agent that co-participates to the emotional appraisal system.
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The metarepresentations in the AIC are structured upon
the integration of salience across all physiological afferent
information at each moment of time and can be conceptualized
as a series of “global emotional moments” (Craig, 2009) moving
from the past to the anticipated future, in a self-aware stream
of consciousness of cinemascopic “images” of the organism
that creates our embodied self-perception. In particular, AIC
seems to contain sub-sequential metarepresentations (in the
range between seconds and subseconds) of all the physiological
functions active in the organism, and the salience of a factor,
in this cinemascopic representation within the interoceptive
matrix, is assessed considering the significance of the factor
for the optimal homeostasis and wellbeing of the organism
(Jänig, 2006).
A second implication, strictly connected with the concept of
sub-sequential metarepresentations of the bodily states across
the time, is the necessary presence of anticipatory models
within the interoceptive matrix. The main function of the
serial set of representations of all interoceptive inputs across a
finite period of time (Craig, 2009) is to provide a functional
homeostatic control. Thus, this function requires “anticipatory
global emotional moments” generated through an internal
behavioral model composed by experiences and expectations,
which creates adjustments in the system by comparing the
anticipated prediction with the objective status of the body.
Moreover, this specific point of view redefines the concept of
emotional moments as subjective and flexible, considering that
the anticipatory behavioral model can subsequently adjust the
internal pattern in the interoceptive cortical system. This buffer,
or comparator, serves as core apparatus in the predictive function
of the interoceptive awareness (Craig, 2009), nonetheless the
informational capacity for salience in the AIC must also be finite,
thus a high rate of accumulation could fill-up the emotional
buffer in a quite short time-frame.
Craig’s proposal of interoceptive salience across time as
an anticipatory global emotional moment, relates to the
free energy principle (Friston, 2009) and process theories or
corollaries like predictive coding. According to the free energy
theory, an organism in order to optimize his functions must
avoid surprising states, which are considered as incoherent
predictions between the actual state of the organism and
the expected condition. Within the homeostatic system, this
approach suggests that global emotion anticipatory models must
reduce the discrepancy between predictions of interoceptive
status and actual homeostatic functioning, with the ultimate
goal of keeping biological processes within specific functional
bounds. Interestingly, in the formal setting of predictive
coding and active inference, salience can also be considered as
salience of sampling and it “can be defined operationally in
terms of minimizing conditional uncertainty about perceptual
representations” (Friston et al., 2012). This fits comfortably
with the notion of anticipatory models that are trying
to reduce the variability or uncertainty about homeostatic
outcomes.
The idea that avoidance of unexpected events requires
a predictive model is not new. Predictive models inside
the interoceptive inference framework (Gu and FitzGerald,
2014) can in fact rely on decision making processes as an
instrument to modulate the behavioral activation in order to
promote a functional homeostasis, reframing Damasio’s somatic
marker hypothesis as an embodied predictive coding contest
(Seth, 2014).
Optimal reduction of free energy can be achieved through
two different processes, predictive/perceptual coding (Rao and
Ballard, 1999; Friston, 2005) and active inference (Friston
et al., 2011; Joffily and Coricelli, 2013). These two pathways
propose an inverted sequence of activation, while predictive
coding represents a change in the prediction to match the
unexpected sensation, the active inference process excites
autonomic reflects to create visceral feelings that fulfill top
down predictions. Consequently, interoceptive predictions errors
and their resolution actuated by the cortical matrix might
contribute to the global experience, both from an emotional
point of view and from a motivational point of view (Seth,
2013).
Recently, Barrett and Simmons (2015) proposed an Embodied
Predictive Interoception Coding (EPIC) model that effortless
integrates predictive coding theory with interoceptive studies
about body perception. Among other interesting hypotheses,
Barret identified three ways of minimizing prediction errors,
along with active and perceptual inference, the authors
suggested that the cognitive network can modulate the
sensation through a shifting in the attention focus, actually
resampling the input, modulating the gain of neurons that
represent the salience of the incoming sensation (Barrett and
Simmons, 2015). This idea finds support in the sampling and
scrutinizing dimensions of the Mature Organism Model (MOM)
(Gifford, 1998) along with the recent work of Talsma that
considered attention as a form of predictive coding (Talsma,
2015).
Lastly, Ondobaka et al. (2015) hypothesized that the sensory
afferent streams to the interoceptive cortex are structured
in a hierarchical way. Different levels of disposition are
therefore distributed in a coherent continuum that moves
from abstract information (higher hierarchy) to visceral inputs
(lower hierarchy), supposing that higher levels entail overly
precise predictions about low level representations; thereby
precluding a revision of high level (integrative) representations
or beliefs—by precise interoceptive input. This perspective
finds support in the compelling work of Edwards et al.
that proposed a neurologically informed model of hierarchical
Bayesian inference (Edwards et al., 2012). In this model, top-
down prior predictions are strictly dependent on the relative
precision of each hierarchical level. This precision is encoded
by the synaptic gain (or post-synaptic responsiveness) in the
upper layers of the cortex in those neurons that report prediction
errors (Edwards et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013), whereas a
specific change in the synaptic gain (i.e., increase precision)
can move the posterior beliefs toward the prior prediction.
This perspective leads to an interesting conclusion according
to which a primary failure of inference could be therefore
characterized by the presence of overly precise priors, encoded
by the synaptic gain in intermediate hierarchical levels (Edwards
et al., 2012).
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RESIDUAL INTEROCEPTIVE GHOSTS
ACROSS TIME. THE R.I.G.T. HYPOTHESIS
Chronic pain is a complex topic. If acute pain fulfills an
informative need aimed at the avoidance of the damage, chronic
pain is purposeless (Allegri, 2015). Current definitions identify
chronic pain as a specific pathology that persists for more than 3
months or beyond the expected time for healing (Merskey et al.,
1994; Treede et al., 2015) but even though the nosology is clearly
determined, the etiopathogenesis of chronic pain conditions is
wide. Chronic pain can originate from pathologic conditions
no longer solvable or beyond the regenerative capacities of the
organism, as well from situations without any detectable organic
dysregulation. In this complex contest, which considers pain as a
multisensory and multidimensional perception, several theories
propose different but integrative perspectives.
Melzack proposed that pain can be considered as an
output of a multidimensional experience generated by specific
neurosignatures that imposed themselves in a distributed neural
network called neuromatrix (Melzack, 2005). This complex
framework considers pain on different levels; specifically it can
be generated by organic causes, such as an injury, but can also
be triggered independently through the spontaneous activation
of neurosignature patterns inside the neuromatrix, providing
an elegant explanation for several chronic conditions without
detectable organic alterations.
The Mature Organism Model (MOM) (Gifford, 1998)
integrates several ideas and suggests that pain can be considered
an integrative experience forged upon sampling, appraisal,
scrutinizing, and response processes from a top-down
perspective. The MOM proposed an embodied cognition of
pain (Thacker, 2015) that sees pain as a perception derivate
from a constant sampling and elaboration of the inner and
outer environment in a predictive coding comparator, in close
accordance to the free energy principle.
Although several chronic pain diseases (i.e., arthritis, low
back pain, etc.) depend upon precise organic tissue damages
that cannot be resolved, a specific set of psychopathological
conditions (i.e., conversion disorders, somatoform disorders,
etc.) elude a medical physiological diagnosis albeit they are
characterized by chronic pain symptoms. From this point of view,
Edwards et al. proposed another interesting perspective (Edwards
et al., 2012), which reconciles Melzack’s and Gifford’s work. The
authors suggested how pathologically precise priors are able to
introduce a primary failure in perceptual inference, effectively
shifting the posterior beliefs toward the predicted sensation,
through attentional modulation of synaptic gain in the neurons
that encode prediction errors on intermediate hierarchical levels,
effectively generating symptoms such as pain.
Merging these perspectives with Craig’s work on the
interoceptive matrix, and the predictive coding framework we
hypothesize that chronic pain creates residual metacognitive
representations inside the probabilistic (generative) model of
the body (Talsma, 2015). If the interoceptive matrix collects
physiological information from all the tissues of the body,
inside this matrix we can necessarily find chronic interoceptive
representations of pain (Figure 1). Three different dimensions
compose these representations:
• a primary interoceptive pattern (Craig, 2009) that includes
the organic chronic information weighed and compared with
past stored patterns and future iterations about the state of
the body. Interoceptive sensations do not exist only as raw
organic information; these sensations are “largely prediction”
(Barrett and Simmons, 2015) and thus they require a constant
integration between expectations and past metacognitive
bodily information. This dimension represents the present
state of the body.
• a series of past representations of the primary interoceptive
pattern that serve as base information to the predictive model
within the buffer. This dimension represents the past state of
the body.
• a series of future representations of the primary interoceptive
pattern, forged upon past representations with the ultimate
goal to predict the future state of the body and minimize the
free energy (i.e., prediction error). This dimension represents
the predictive future state of the body.
Although the primary interoceptive pattern represents the
fundamental unit of the appraisal process, these three dimensions
compose the interoceptive pathway that recursively develops
altered chronic representations across time in upper layers
through ascending integration, according to a hierarchical
organization model (Edwards et al., 2012; Ondobaka et al.,
2015). The iterative anticipation cycles between AIC and ACC,
also integrate the behavioral agent through emotions, beliefs,
environmental information, expectations and memories (Craig,
2002, 2003, 2009), creating a global emotional moment of the
chronic pain, anchored in the past, in the present, and in the
future and therefore resilient to changes.
We hypothesize that these three components create a “ghost”
representation that is a residual image of the pain signature
located in the interoceptive primary pattern, in the priors, and
in the memories of past sensations. The “residual interoceptive
ghosts across time” (R.I.G.T) hypothesis suggests multiple ghosts
that can be identifying not only the interoceptive immanent
level but also in the endless cinemascopic images composing
the priors that anticipate the feelings of the body, as well in
the past mnemonic metarepresentations of the state of the
body.
The ghosts exist transversally on multiple levels in the past,
in the present, and in the future, and “the interaction between
a master comparator buffer and the time series of global
emotional moments might be experienced introspectively as an
“observer” that nonetheless cannot “see” itself ” (Craig, 2009). It
is therefore possible that sequential past ghost representations are
stored as observer memories (i.e., “allocentric representations”)
becoming resilient to updates provided by contrasting egocentric
representations coming from perceptual inputs (Riva, 2014).
This peculiar dimension enforces the perception of pain itself
through a self-sustaining anticipatory loop in a distributed
neural network. The ghost representations can also outlast the
physiological injuries or, equally, they can anticipate the pain
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FIGURE 1 | Residual interoceptive ghosts across time. The draws (left) represent the interoceptive matrix (IM) in which primary interoceptive units (triangles) are
single pieces of the whole interoceptive landscape. The black triangle represents the primary interoceptive unit (pIU) connected to pain. In a healthy (a) subject,
interoceptive units have a short life and are quickly updated and dispersed in a fluid bodily landscape. In chronic (b) conditions pIU is impressed in different dimensions
creating residual interoceptive images (ghosts) across time, which easily fill-up the interoceptive buffer. Ghosts are represented by darker triangles; the shades of gray
suggest different intensities and collocations across time. The drawing (right) represents the three-dimensional structure of interoceptive information, applied to chronic
pain. The pIU is composed by the organic chronic information (c) weighed and compared with past stored patterns (d) and future iterations (e) about the state of the
body. The pIU is stored in the past memories (f) and the past memories are used to forge the interoceptive prediction (g) in the future. Past memories, future predictions
and actual state (pIU) of the body are confronted in the comparator (h) that also accesses the matrix to initialize compensatory responses. This cycle is dispersed (i) at
different levels from the AIC to the ACC, according to Craig’s global emotional moment. The residual past memories and future representations at all levels are
detached from the original organic information thus they are, actually, residual images (ghosts) of the original input that represented the chronic pain information.
before the organic threshold (Harvie et al., 2015), creating auto-
predictive “ghost patterns” inside the representation of the body.
The R.I.G.T. hypothesis integrates Melzack’s neurosignature
and the MOM proposal and it suggests a new contribution
according to which chronic interoceptive patterns extend across
time, in residual images (ghosts) not only in the present but also
in the past and in the future. These distributed presences provide
the self-sustained information for the primary anticipatory buffer
comparator and at the same time extend themselves across
the different layers that create the pathway under the global
emotional moment (Craig, 2009). It is important to understand
that ghosts exist for every physiological state because every
state has a primary interoceptive representation reported at
different levels in the brain and across time, nevertheless in
non-pathological conditions ghosts have usually a brief shelf
life. They are constantly updated, changed, and modified,
creating a fluid interoceptive landscape as Craig suggested (Craig,
2009). Albeit this fluid nature, in pathological conditions ghosts
become chronic, impressing themselves in a resilient way across
multiple areas and multiple time dimensions in auto-sustained
loops.
An ancillary hypothesis is that constant interoceptive
information about chronic pain disrupts the interoceptive
matrix on the three different levels, filling up the finite
salience capacity of the buffer that serves as comparator (Craig,
2009) for the integration of the predictive metarepresentations.
The “interoceptive saturation hypothesis” suggests that high
accumulation rate of information fed by a chronic (constant)
condition can saturate the matrix lowering the salience, or
the precision according to Edwards et al. (2012), of other
inputs. Interestingly, this provides an explanation to the low
interoceptive accuracy (Garfinkel and Critchley, 2013; Garfinkel
et al., 2015) in chronic pain subjects (Pollatos et al., 2011; Weiss
et al., 2014; Duschek et al., 2015).
The buffer can be filled-up according to three different
mechanisms of free energy principle: active and perceptual
inference and shifting in attentional focus (i.e., redeploying
precision to different streams of prediction errors). In chronic
conditions, pain signals from the body can easily fill-up the
buffer, the priors, and the mnemonic metarepresentation of
past sensations, impairing the processing of other interoceptive
inputs. Nevertheless, the connection between interoceptive
accuracy (formerly known as “sensitivity”) and pain processing
shows a complex nature. Recent evidence demonstrated that
high interoceptive accuracy can predispose healthy subjects
to an enhanced perception of acute pain and a decreased
acute pain tolerance (Pollatos et al., 2012). Moreover, enhanced
interoceptive accuracy seems to pose as major predictor to
paradoxical pain experiences (Scheuren et al., 2014) in healthy
subjects. To make sense of these results we have to consider
that these studies explored the perception of acute pain that is
neurologically and functionally different from chronic pain. As
presented above, chronic pain is a specific pathology able to
produce profound changes on both brain function and structure
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(Baliki et al., 2008; Geha et al., 2008; Tagliazucchi et al., 2010).
Moreover, chronic pain shows a different informative value
than acute pain: if chronic pain is purposeless (Allegri, 2015),
acute pain has a functional value as protective response to
damages. Therefore, it makes perfect sense that subjects with
high interoceptive accuracy show an enhanced perception of
pain because information that can help avoid damages must
have high salience to preserve the homeostatic balance of the
organism.
The “interoceptive saturation hypothesis” can also explain low
interoceptive accuracy in other psychopathological conditions,
such as anorexia nervosa (Pollatos et al., 2008). In these
situations, the high accumulation rate of information that fill-
up the buffer is provided by top-down processes that originate
in the behavioral agent within the ACC, equally impairing the
perception of bottom-up interoceptive input, probably through
high precision priors (Edwards et al., 2012; Adams et al., 2013).
The saturation hypothesis presents a major implication,
related to treatments. Although interoceptive training to improve
accuracy can produce benefits (Schaefer et al., 2014) they may
have limited applications and effectiveness because they do not
suppress the interference from other inputs that fill-up the buffer.
Event thought accuracy can be improved through interoceptive
training, the limited size of the buffer poses an upper bound
on the results that can be achieved, meaning that we cannot
constantly improve a limited, or imprecise according to Edwards
et al. (2012), function. We have to reduce or suppress the
interference from other factors.
A NEW IDEA FOR TREATMENT:
INTEROCEPTIVE MODELING
According to our hypotheses, chronic pain is a resilient
multicomposed perception that floods the interoceptive buffer
with constant input, lowering subject’s ability to access his
own interoceptive information. The multidimensional nature
of chronic pain defines the complexity of pain management
treatments because they fail to compensate the distributed
nature of these perceptions across time. To address the issue
we propose the idea of interoceptive modeling (Figure 2), as
a technique to feed interoceptive information through external
(exteroceptive) input, forcing alterations in the interoceptive
matrix.
Considering that “interoceptive sensation is largely
prediction” (Barrett and Simmons, 2015), the core concept of
interoceptive modeling is to update the priors from outside the
body, through an exteroceptive feed of interoceptive information,
rewriting the interoceptive primary representation and letting
this modified pattern propagate in the global emotional
moments, altering present, past, and future representations.
This update can be considered a variant of perceptual inference
because internal models are modified, nevertheless through an
iterative loop the system will subsequentially promotes an active
inference adaptation, because of constant updates emerging
from the comparison between predictions and the actual state of
the body.
Interoceptive modeling aims at altering the dimension of
pain perception (priors) and the interoceptive signature created
by a long lasting chronic condition, actively rewriting ghosts
inside the distributed network. Nevertheless, we hypothesize
that this kind of modeling will also produce physiological
compensatory responses, considering that previous evidence
suggested that interoceptive alterations can reflect on the body
through autonomic pathways (Moseley et al., 2008; Barnsley
et al., 2011; Tsakiris et al., 2011).
From a technical point of view, interoceptive modeling
requires to superimpose external symbolic interoceptive
information to compensate the interoceptive dysfunctional
patterns. This concept entails two inalienable preconditions:
that the subject is malleable to external input to determine his
own interoceptive information, and that the external input must
not violate the probabilistic representation of the interoceptive
pattern.
Tsakiris specifically explored the “active modulatory role of
interoception on the experience of the body from outside”
(Tsakiris et al., 2011), providing evidence that subjects with
low interoceptive accuracy are more susceptible to integrate
exteroceptive input to determine information about their own
body. At the same time, the work of Tsakiris proved that
external information can alter the perception of the body
both on the behavioral and on the autonomic level. Although
interferences in the homeostatic regulation caused by a flow
of exteroceptive information have already been demonstrated
in previous studies (Moseley et al., 2008) the work of Tsakiris
has been the first to identify the interoceptive system as
predictive factor for malleability in the body representation.
Specifically, Tsakiris suggested that subjects with low access to
interoceptive information may rely more on exteroceptive input
to determine their own body condition. Contrary, subjects with
high interoceptive accuracy, who have access to more precise and
stable information about their own body, could be more resilient
to external influences. These findings set an important bound to
the applicability of interoceptive modeling for treatment, such
as only subjects with low interoceptive accuracy may be suitable
for external manipulation of interoceptive patterns. Fortunately,
chronic pain along with several different psychopathological
conditions, showed a consistent pattern of low interoceptive
accuracy, providing an innovative opportunity for interoceptive
modeling treatments.
About the second precondition, Talsma advocated that
multisensory integration depends upon a coherent internal
mental representation that is a metacognitive merging of top-
down and bottom-up processes (Talsma, 2015). The author
suggested that a simple mismatch between information
internally represented together, could lead to impaired
performances because incongruent multisensory modalities
violate the consistency of the model leading to increasing
prediction errors. Contrary, congruent inputs are able to
provide a consistent match to the internal representation,
reducing the prediction error and increasing the consistency
of the metacognitive representation (Talsma, 2015) also on
interoceptive level. Other authors (Tsakiris et al., 2011) suggested
that multisensory integration requires a coherent representation
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FIGURE 2 | Interoceptive modeling. In Figure 1 we represented the interoceptive matrix (IM) as a set of static triangles, for convenience. Nevertheless, IM is fluid
and dynamic, thus it can be better represented through a series of waves. In a healthy (A) subject, the landscape constantly changes while in a chronic pain (B)
subject the signature of the pain is resiliently distributed across time, disrupting the access to other interoceptive information (fading background waves). Interoceptive
modeling applies to a chronic pain subject (t1) and proposes to feed an external input (EF) to compensate (t2) the interoceptive primary representation of chronic pain.
The concept is similar to counterphase modulation of sound waves, where two waves cancel each other (t3). To avoid prediction errors, the procedure will start
mimicking the chronic interoceptive pattern and slowing modeling the feed through counterphase information. IM adapted from The Cambridge Encyclopedia of
Astronomy.
of the body, posing the multisensory congruency on different
levels (visual, anatomical, spatial, postural etc.) as a core element
of a successful merging. These evidence suggested that, to be
effective, interoceptive modeling must feed information that can
be consistently integrated in the interoceptive matrix, without
excessively violating the internal consistency to avoid substantial
prediction errors that will compromise the effectiveness of the
treatment.
Interoceptive modeling is forged upon this framework, and
it aims at projecting complementary interoceptive information
that overrides chronic pain representations on the diffuse neural
network. The process would feed exteroceptive information in
subjects with low interoceptive accuracy to update interoceptive
patterns connected to the chronic pain. Since chronic pain
subjects with low accuracy rely on external input for interoceptive
information, iterative discrepancies between the external feed
and the interoceptive pattern can be resolved only by
updating the internal model on the subordinate interoceptive
level. This process will overwrite the mental representations
of pain (ghosts) creating permanent alterations both at
neurological level and at cognitive level. Furthermore, the
possibility to elicit autonomic responses through active inference
(Moseley et al., 2008; Barnsley et al., 2011) also suggests
possible effects on physiological levels based upon the fact
that interoceptive matrix not only work as store box for
information but it usually also contains autonomic response
patterns.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR
TREATMENT AND CHALLENGES
As far as we know, interoceptive modeling treatments have never
been theorized neither developed from a practical point of view.
Nevertheless, although several implications and challenges need
to be addressed, some previous studies support the concept of
interoceptive modulation through external input.
Augmented reality (AR) or immersive virtual reality (VR)
can offer instruments to promote interoceptive modeling, as
Aspell demonstrated in a recent study. The author provided
evidence that a subject can use exteroceptive information about
the heart rate to modulate the perception of the body effectively
shifting the sense of ownership and incorporation. The results
suggested that interoceptive information fed by exteroceptive
sources can influence the perception of the body (Aspell et al.,
2013). Aspell experiment also proved that the body can use
exteroceptive information to determine internal interoceptive
properties; moreover the experiment demonstrated that subjects
can use visual information of interoceptive representations
to modulate the interoceptive matrix. This provides evidence
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that interceptive information can be represented in different
forms, i.e., heartbeat has been represented as silhouette outside
the body and nevertheless it was able to tap in the material
self of the subject, creating a sense of ownership and altered
tactile acuity, directly supporting the possibility to use visual
and exteroceptive information to modulate the interoceptive
representations. Another example is the work of Serino et al.
(2016) that used exteroceptive VR input to provide an update of
the internal representation of the body through a proprioceptive
modeling in healthy subjects. Moreover, the VR approach to
interoceptive modeling will reduce prediction errors leading to
an increased sense of presence because in virtual environments
perceptual inference can diminish the density of interoceptive
signals, through salient external inputs that foster acceptance
of exteroceptive information as “one’s own embodied state”
(Farb et al., 2015) creating an update of the simulation
map.
If virtual or augmented reality can provide technical
instruments for interoceptive modeling, one of the major
challenges that must be resolved is the virtual representation
of the interoceptive pattern associate to the chronic pain
and its consequently complementary modelization that will
serve as overwriting information. Nonetheless, working with
pain simplifies the task to gather the interoceptive signature
of the perception because several qualitative scales collect
morphological and dimensional aspects of pain, along with
its sensory characteristics. Among others, the Iconic Pain
Assessment Tool, recently revisited in a web-based tool (Lalloo
et al., 2014) provided 15 somatic markers (Damasio, 1996;
Damasio et al., 2000) that describe different type of sensations
connected to pain. These markers are unique and each one
represents the symbolic translation of a specific type of pain, thus
they can be utilized to precisely track the interoceptive pattern
of pain sensation and to build its virtual representation and its
complementary overwriting feed.
Albeit the ultimate goal of interoceptive modeling is to
update the internal models through a process that resembles
perceptual inference, the treatment must not violate the internal
coherence of the bodily representation (Talsma, 2015) avoiding
pervasive prediction errors that can impair the process. Possible
impairments in the treatment are related to the fact that
subjects can oppose the external feed due to unsustainable
mismatching conflicts or worse, a feed that violates the
probabilistic representation of the body can be nonetheless
integrated creating pervasive prediction errors leading to stressful
autonomic responses (Farb et al., 2015).
To avoid violations in the probabilistic representation of
the body, interoceptive modeling envisages two phases of the
treatment. In the “mimicking phase” the external feed must
mimic the interoceptive information we want to compensate (i.e.,
chronic pain); the mimicking must be internally coherent with
the representation of the body, reproducing the characteristics
of the chronic interoceptive pain information and fostering
multisensory congruency (Tsakiris et al., 2011; Zeller et al., 2015)
upon different dimensions. In fact, multisensory congruency
during the mimicking phase will not only integrate pain somatic
markers collected via qualitative scales, but it will also integrate
multisensory information through spatial, visual, anatomical,
and other physiological inputs.
The mimicking phase aims at pairing the external feed with
the internal representation of the body, helping subjects to accept
the external feed as “one’s own embodied state” (Farb et al.,
2015) due to the fact that low interoceptive accuracy fosters
multisensory integration of external inputs, especially when
these inputs are coherent (Talsma, 2015) with the interoceptive
representation.
After the integration of the external feed, without prediction
errors or autonomic stressful responses, the treatment will
introduce the “modeling phase” to manipulate internal
representations connected to chronic pain. Modeling aims
at altering the external inputs through counterphase information
in an adjusted process that will slowly change the feed to
counterbalance the initial mimicked representation. To avoid
congruency violations in the probabilistic representation of
the body, the modeling phase could introduce alterations
in a modulatory incremental method that resembles the
concepts of “titration” and “pendulation” in the practice of
Somatic Experiencing (Levine, 1976, 1997, 2010). Specifically,
titration refers to a process that sequentially introduces
graduated changes, allowing the interoceptive system to adapt
without triggering a cascade of stressful autonomic responses;
while pendulation refers to a process that fosters oscillations
between activation and deactivation phases to improve the
balance of the autonomic system, re-framing the interoceptive
representations (Payne et al., 2015). Interoceptive modeling
will use a similar method to conjugate incremental systematic
alterations (titration) of the external feed in an oscillatory way
(pendulation) to tap in the interoceptive ghost representations
without violating the coherence of the representation of the
body (Zeller et al., 2015). Moreover, while some information
related to the chronic pain (i.e., somatic makers that represent
the pain and its intensity) will be changed, other information
(i.e., spatial, anatomical, etc.) will remain congruent with the
probabilistic representation of the body, allowing the treatment
to introduce updates in the internal models without eliciting
pervasive violations.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In the present paper, we identified a three dimensional
conceptualization of chronic pain, hypothesizing that an
overflow of interoceptive information, predictive inferences, and
mnemonic representations can produce residual interoceptive
images (ghosts) across time. These ghosts, which could therefore
rely on high precision priors encoded in the synaptic gain of
prediction error neurons (Edwards et al., 2012; Adams et al.,
2013), can saturate the buffer inside the interoceptive cortex,
leading to a diminished interoceptive accuracy.
Evidence suggested that subjects with low interoceptive
accuracy are open to utilize exteroceptive input to modulate
their own interoceptive landscape, both on a behavioral/cognitive
level and an autonomic level as well. This particular condition
allowed us to propose a new idea for treatments forged
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upon interoceptive modeling, that is the use of exteroceptive
input to modulate interoceptive patterns, through overwriting
informational feeds. Interoceptive modeling requires different
conditions; the predisposition of the subject to incorporate
exteroceptive information, a coherent representation of these
information that must not violate the internal interoceptive
coherence, a set of instruments able to feed information, and a
precise modelization of the information and their compensative
overwriting inputs.
In this regard, Farb et al. (2015) suggested that utilizing
exteroceptive input to substitute interoceptive information to
reduce prediction errors may create dysfunctional patterns. To
sustain this affirmation the author referred to evidence from
the rubber hand illusion (RHI) studies that found decreased
skin perfusion and temperature (Moseley et al., 2008) along
with increased stress hormone release (Barnsley et al., 2011)
in the resting arm. Addressing the evidence proposed by Farb,
we have to consider that every kind of violation can instantly
elicit prediction errors, fostering autonomic dysregulations and
impairing the results (Wallace et al., 2004; Kording et al., 2007)
of a possible treatment. From this point of view, switching a
hand in the RHI represents a huge violation of the conservatory
representation of the body. Thus, we suggest that this kind of
illusion actually increases prediction errors inside the network
(i.e., mismatch between actual proprioceptive location and
perceived location) leading to dysfunctional patterns, in a
procedure fundamentally different from interoceptive modeling.
RHI is a very peculiar type of process that violates the
basic principles of our proposed idea. Specifically, interoceptive
modeling aims at not disrupting the conservative probabilistic
representation of the body (Talsma, 2015) stored in the
interoceptive matrix. As explained, the mimicking phase
and the modeling phase aim at reducing violations toward
the interoceptive representation, thus interoceptive modeling
can hypothetically update internal models without inducing
pervasive prediction errors or violations in the representation of
the body.
Future directions are open to several possibilities; chronic
pain treatments forged upon interoceptive modeling can
provide an innovative and effective option for a disease
that affects 1 in 5 adults in Europe (Breivik et al., 2006).
Nevertheless, interoceptive modeling is not limited only to
chronic pain. Every organic function is represented inside
the interoceptive matrix, thus we can hypothesize that several
physiological dysregulations (hormonal, immunological
etc.) operate in the same manner creating an interference
that extend across multiple dimensions in the distributed
predictive network. Therefore, understanding how interoceptive
modeling works can bring insight useful to develop
treatments for a variety of conditions, well beyond chronic
pain.
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